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SALES OF SUBDIVIDED REALTY -
CAPITAL GAINS V. ORDINARY INCOME
John L. Primmer
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most litigated areas in the tax law, arising in a multi-
tude of ways, concerns the treatment given to gains and losses re-
sulting from sales of realty.' Suppose an investor in real estate takes
advantage of the rapid growth around his property and the attendant
rise in fair market value by selling. Suppose a dealer in real estate
sells a parcel of land which has been segregated from his stock in
trade. Suppose the owner of the rental houses or apartments begins to
dispose of them. The question presented, of course, is whether profits
from these and similar transactions should be taxed at ordinary or
capital gains rates. The problem is not new, but it remains important
so long as an active market in real estate is maintained through the
growth of urban communities.
This Comment is not intended to deal generally with the area of
capital gains and ordinary income, but rather with a specific statutory
exclusion from capital gains. Nevertheless, a brief general discussion
of the equitable considerations which led to the present preferential
treatment given the sale of capital assets is necessary. Capital gains
treatment was first allowed after it was recognized that taxation at
ordinary rates for gains from the sale of property held over a long
period of time was an unjust burden on the taxpayer.' Many were
paying taxes completely disproportionate to the taxes they ordinarily
paid because they were taxed in one year for an increment in value
which had taken place over a period of several years. In addition, the
profits realized were taxed at much higher rates, due to the graduated
tax, than they would have been had the income been spread over a
number of years. Because it was impractical to tax the gains at rates
equivalent to what would have been paid for the increase in value
' For further references in this area see generally: Groh, Tax Problems in Real Estate,
36 Taxes 267 (1958); Herzberg, Dealer or Investor? 37 Taxes 155 (1959); Levin, Capital
Gains or Income Tax on Real Estate Sales, 37 B.U.L. Rev. 165 (1957); Repetti, What Con-
stitutes a Dealer under Section 1237, N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 651 (1959); Ruben-
stein, A Few Federal Income Tax Aspects of Selling Land-Ordinary Income vs. Long-
Term Capital Gains, 22 Brooklyn L. Rev. 56 (1955); Spandorf & Tonelson, Capital Gains
Provisions for Real Estate Investors in Section 1237-More Promise Than Fact, 8 J. Taxation
201 (1958); Weithorn, Subdivision of Real Estate-"Dealer v. Investor Problem, 8 Tax L.
Rev. 157 (1953).2 S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921); H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 11 (1921). Both reports also claimed that the prohibitive tax rates were stifling
the turnover of the property.
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for each year the property was held, an arbitrary rate lower than
the ordinary rates was applied to these sales.' As with any remedial
legislation aimed at relieving the burdens of a few, everyone attempts
to take advantage of the capital gains provisions. Often, preferential
treatment is sought when the equitable considerations which originally
brought about capital gains treatment are absent. Even though use of
the provision may have been abused, these considerations are still
present in many cases and should not be ignored.
The Internal Revenue Code contains three sections which are
applicable to realty sales. The first, section 122 1,4 is a general capital
gains provision. It defines a capital asset broadly as "property held by
the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or busi-
ness) ."' This section lists a number of specific exclusions from this
definition, two of which may be applicable to realty sales. The first
is "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business."' Another exclusion is
depreciable property or realty used in the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness.' If the property is found to be within the first exclusion, capital
gains treatment is denied. If the property fits within the second
category, it is covered by section 1231,' which allows capital gains
treatment in the event of a gain and an ordinary loss deduction in
the case of a loss.9 Section 1231 is the second statute applicable to
sales of realty and it, like section 1221, denies capital gains treatment
to sales of property held primarily for sale.1" A third statute, section
1237,"1 deals specifically with subdivided realty. The primary purpose
of section 1237 is to provide some relief to the taxpayer who sells
subdivided lots and who, under the other statutes as applied by the
courts, might be found to be a dealer in real estate. Supposedly, the
standards in section 1237 for determining whether property is held
3 The original rate at which capital gains were taxed was 12112%. Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 233.4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 1221.
5 ibid.
a nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221 (1). This exclusion was originally placed in 5 1221
as an amendment to the then-existing exclusion which only applied to inventory. Revenue
Act of 1924, ch. 234, S 208 (a) (8), 43 Stat. 262. The purpose of the amendment was to
take recognition of the fact that property might be held for sale without being included
in inventory. H.R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1924). Land is not required
to be and it usually is not included in inventory.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(2).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231(a).
"I1nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231(b) (1) (B). The result of cases dealing with the
question whether the property is held primarily for sale is substantially the same whether
the taxpayer attempts to qualify under § 1221 or § 1231. Differences in the computation of
the tax are sometimes present in the two sections, but they are not material here.1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237.
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primarily for sale are easier for the taxpayer to meet than those
applied under sections 1221 and 123 1.12
The cases dealing with realty sales involving capital gains prob-
lems revolve almost entirely around the question of whether the
property was held for sale. Generally, if the property is sold as the
taxpayer acquired it, it will be given capital gains treatment." It is
when the taxpayer subdivides, improves the property and devotes a
substantial amount of time and energy to his sales that the problems
arise. By so doing, he acts much as would a dealer in real estate, thus
presenting the question whether the property is held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW BY APPELLATE COURTS
An introductory factor, separate from the substantive aspects of
this area but important to the taxpayer, is whether the court hearing
his case considers the property held for sale test to be one of fact,
law, ultimate fact or mixed law and fact. In a large percentage of
these cases the facts are stipulated, the only remaining question being
whether or not the taxpayer falls under the statutory exclusion from
capital gains. Thus, the willingness of the reviewing court to re-
evaluate the facts on appeal from the tax court or district courts
and its attitudes toward capital gains are substantial considerations.
Those courts which consider it a fact question usually restrict them-
selves to use of the "clearly erroneous"' 4 or substantial evidence '
rule of review. Those courts which consider it a question of law may
freely determine the question anew; the result is much the same in
the courts which call it a question of ultimate fact."
Apparently the characterization of the question is used more as
a means of obtaining what the court considers the proper outcome
than as a logical standard of review. The greatest number of tax
cases in the circuit courts are appeals from decisions adverse to the
taxpayer, and if the reviewing court agrees with the decision, the
simplest way to dispose of a case is to hold that the issues presented
1Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237(a) states that property will not be found to be held
primarily for sale merely by reason of the taxpayer's subdividing and carrying on sales
activities in selling it.
"3 Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130, 136 (6th Cir. 1958).
" See, e.g., Bauschard v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960).
"5Stockton Harbor Industrial Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 904 (1954); Gruver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1944).
"Compare Voss v. United States, 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964), with Yunker v. Com-
missioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1958). But see Tidwell v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 864
(4th Cir. 1962), in which the question was labeled one of ultimate fact, but the "clearly
erroneous" rule was applied.
[Vol. 19:116
COMMENTS
are fact issues which the trial court correctly decided. Other courts,
more willing to find for the taxpayer, have answered by character-
izing the test as one necessitating legal reasoning, thus reserving power
to reverse the lower court. The Ninth Circuit, which usually sides
with the Commissioner," has repeatedly held that the question is one
of fact. In Bistline v. United States," the court strongly reiterated
this position. The district court had ruled against the taxpayer when
she sold property received as a gift from her father, a dealer in real
estate. Though the property was partially improved when she re-
ceived it, she made no further improvements. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court and stated: "This is obviously a question of
fact, which ordinarily is governed by the findings of the trial court,
unless these are clearly erroneous or unless an appellate court is con-
vinced by an examination of the entire record that a mistake has
been made. Much of the criticism directed at the appellate opinions
in this field has a sophomoric ring because of the failure of the
writers to regard this principle.""' The court, however, was less re-
luctant in United States v. Beard," decided the same month as Bist-
line, to overturn a district court decision in favor of the taxpayer.
Beard repeated that the determination was one of fact and subject
to the clearly erroneous rule, but it added that a number of earlier
decisions in the circuit were persuasive of a decision that this par-
ticular finding was wrong.' Thus, the court substituted its judgment
for that of the trial court, not on the basis of an erroneous fact
finding, but rather on what it considered to be the inference, in
accord with previous cases, to be drawn from the evidence. Thus,
the scope of review given in Beard, although termed a fact test, was
at least as broad as that given by courts which adhere to the "ulti-
mate fact" classification.
Some of the circuits characterize the question as one of ultimate
fact, thereby freeing themselves from the clearly erroneous rule, in
cases in which the only issue to be determined is whether or not the
property is held for sale." These cases generally state that the question
17 An example of the Ninth Circuit's attitude toward capital gains is found in Pacific
Homes, Inc. v. United States, 230 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1956). There the taxpayer was
seeking capital gains on the sales of rental homes which had been regulated by the National
Housing Agency during World War II as defense worker's housing. The opinion began,
"The sovereign is not to be frustrated in the replenishment of its fist by the fine-spun
arguments advanced by the appellant." Id. at 756. The opinion later refers to the taxpayers'
sales methods as "Machiavellian subtlety." Id. at 760.
8 260 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1958).
19Id. at 78.
20260 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1958).
21 Id. at 85.
" Gudgel v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1959); Curtis Co. v. Commissioner,
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is resolved through a process of legal inference and reasoning,
and thus it is for the reviewing court to determine whether the result
reached stems from a correct view of the law. 3 Nevertheless, it is
not possible to dig very deeply into the cases within each circuit
without discovering contradictions. For example, the Fifth Circuit,
which subscribes to the "ultimate fact" label,"4 has apparently also
treated it as a question of law"1 and a question of ultimate fact subject
to the clearly erroneous rule."8 Likewise, the cases in this circuit
which have emphasized the taxpayer's statement that he was not
holding the property primarily for sale in the course of the business
actually are based entirely on a single fact determination."' The Sixth
Circuit has adhered to the "ultimate fact" classification in the past,"
but two recent cases, holding that the ultimate question is one of
fact, indicate that that circuit no longer intends to substitute its
judgment unless the lower court's determination is clearly erroneous.
The Seventh Circuit stands alone in consistently holding that the
held for sale question is one of law.3" That court has left the door
open to broad review even if subsidiary fact issues are in dispute. In
Voss v. United States,"1 the court stated that although the jury is to
determine disputed questions of fact, the court is to determine
whether the evidence warrants submission of the ultimate question
to the jury."'
232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956); Consolidated Naval Stores v. Fahs, 227 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.
1955).
2 The courts which have thus characterized the question seem to have done so on the
basis of a statement by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S.
665, 670-71 (1944):
The conclusiveness of a "finding of fact" depends on the nature of the
materials on which the finding is based. The finding even of a "subsidiary"
fact may be a more or less difficult problem varying according to the sim-
plicity or subtlety of the type of "fact" in controversy. Finding so-called ulti-
mate "facts" more clearly implies the application of standards of law ...
Though labeled "finding of fact," it may involve the very basis on which
judgment of fallible evidence is to be made. Thus, the conclusion that may
appropriately be drawn from the whole mass of evidence is not always the
ascertainment of the kind of "fact" that precludes consideration by [the
reviewing] court.
2 Gamble v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Consolidated Naval Stores v.
Fahs, 227 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1955); Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.
1955); Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954).
"a Ross v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1955).
" Lobello v. Dunlop, 210 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954).
27Ross v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1955); Foran v. Commissioner, 165
F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1948). See text accompanying notes 42 and 43 infra.
" Gudgel v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1959); Yunker v. Commissioner,
256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1958).
s' Mathews v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1963); Bauschard v. Commissioner,
279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960).
" Chandler v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955); Three States Lumber Co.
v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1946).
3a 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964).
a The district court had submitted to the jury only the question of whether the prop-
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The courts would have less difficulty in finding a common stand-
ard of review if it were not used as a method of reaching a result
with which each court agrees. Indeed, the willingness of the Ninth
Circuit to substitute its judgment more readily when the trial court's
decision is in favor of the taxpayer,"3 and the willingness, in the same
situation, of the Fifth Circuit to abide by the clearly erroneous rule,"
seem to be strong indications that the standard for scope of review is
no more than an accommodation for those circuits' attitudes toward
capital gains.
III. HELD PRIMARILY FOR SALE IN ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE OR
BUSINESS'
A. "Busyness" Or "Intent"
It would be difficult to find statutory language which has been
subjected to so diverse an interpretation and application as has been
the phrase "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."" What
constitutes property held for sale has received discordant analysis.
The conflicts which have arisen may be partially explained by the
differing emphasis placed on the respective components of the statu-
tory exclusion. This exclusion, as applied to realty transactions,
logically embodies two major elements. The first, "property held . . .
primarily for sale . . " is a subjective concept which looks to the
purpose for which the property was held-i.e., the taxpayer's intent
in relation to the transactions. This intent, however, is not meant to
mean merely a scienter or state of mind on the part of the taxpayer
which is present when he sells his lots. Rarely does one stop to think
of whether he is a dealer or an investor as he disposes of his property.
Rather, the intent element should include a number of components,
both objective and subjective, which pertain to the entire transaction
from the time the land is acquired until the lots are sold. What com-
ponents will make up this factor depends, of course, on each par-
ticular case.
erty was held primarily for sale. Voss v. United States, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9486 (E.D.
Wis. 1962).
aSSee e.g. notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text.
8 U.S. v. Kalmutz, 309 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1962).
5 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have contributed more cases -in this area than have the
other circuits, primarily because there are a good deal more land transactions within the
states which lie in the jurisdiction of those courts. The other circuits have for the most
part followed the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Also, there is more divergence between the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits' views than between any of the others. For these reasons, this
Comment will focus mainly upon the Fifth and Ninth. At the same time, a circuit by
circuit breakdown is not intended except when there are striking conflicts.
so This exclusion will hereinafter be referred to in a shortened form, i.e., "property held
primarily for sale."
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The second element, "in the ordinary course of [a] trade or busi-
ness," connotes an objective standard, viz., whether the activities
carried on by the taxpayer contemporaneous to his realty sales amount
in fact to his carrying on a business. The factors which make up this
objective consideration, as well as the intent factors, will be discussed
in more detail in a later section. Throughout this Comment, reference
will be made to the varying emphases placed by the courts on the
intent or "busyness" elements. A statement that the court examined
or emphasized the taxpayer's intent will generally mean (excepting
the Ross and Foran cases3") that the court considered all of the fac-
tors surrounding the entire transaction, from acquisition to sale. Like-
wise, when the court is said to emphasize "busyness" it will usually
mean that the court's consideration was limited to the factors pres-
ent at the time the sales were made.
A substantial number of earlier cases, in effect, disregarded all of
the statutory language except the objective (trade or business) stand-
ard. In Snell v. Commissioner,"0 the court stated that the word "busi-
ness" was merely a disguised spelling of "busyness" 3 and held that
the taxpayer was in the business of selling real estate when he was
kept "more or less busy"' with his sales. Several cases adopted this
approach by limiting their examination to the circumstances con-
temporaneous to the sales.' 1 In those decisions, once the external
indicia of a business were found to exist at the time of the sale, the
other requirements of the exclusion seemed to fall in place.
It is paradoxical that the same court which placed the word "busy-
ness" in the capital gains vocabulary went to the other extreme in
emphasizing, in effect, the "held . . . primarily," or purpose held,
criterion. In Ross v. Commissioner' and Foran v. Commissioner,
the court elevated this element to sole importance in reversing lower
court decisions which had held that taxpayers were in the real estate
business when there was substantial evidence of activity on their part.
The court's basis in reversing was the taxpayers' testimony that they
did not intend to hold the property for sale in the course of a busi-
ness. Evidence of prior dealings in real estate and "busyness" with
respect to the sales in question was not sufficient to override these
statements."
3 See notes 42-44 infra and accompanying text.
3'97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938).
39 Id. at 892.
40 Ibid.
41See, e.g., 512 West Fifty-Sixth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 942, 944 (2d
Cir. 1945); Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1941).
42227 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1955).
43 165 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1948).
41 Both decisions held that evidence of prior dealings was competent, but that in these
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The language of the exclusion in sections 1221 and 1231 indicates
that both of the extreme approaches above are inadequate means of
effectuating Congressional intent. ' A taxpayer who acts in such a
way that it appears he is in the business of selling real estate may
actually intend to hold the property primarily for sale in the course
of that business. Nevertheless, there are instances in which the tax-
payer becomes quite active in disposing of what he believes to be a
capital asset without intending to become a dealer in real estate.
Many considerations may influence the taxpayer in the manner he
adopts in selling his investment, and these considerations should be
taken into account. Nonetheless, a bald statement that it is not the
intent of the taxpayer to hold the property primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business should not be allowed
to negate strong objective evidence to the contrary.
The majority of the cases seem to take both of these major ele-
ments into account in determining how the property was held." Gen-
erally, these considerations are broken down into a number of smaller
factors."' The labels ascribed to these factors and the weight given
to each again are subject to the diverse views of the courts hearing
the cases. For purposes of this Comment each factor has been grouped
cases it should not have the weight of an uncontroverted statement by the taxpayer that
the oroverty was not held primarily for sale.
" Although not dealing with the sale of realty, Greenspoon v. Commissioner discussed
the conflict in the cases in this area. The court said:
The apparent conflict in the lines of cases ...can perhaps in some instances
be explained on the basis of factual differences. There also appear to be differ-
ences in the law applied. It would be impossible to reconcile all the con-
flicting decisions and, since the factual situation presented by the particular
case is the important and controlling factor, little would be accomplished by
discussing the cases in detail. On the whole, the cases denying the capital
gains treatment appear to do so on the basis of finding a few similarities
between the way in which liquidation was conducted and the manner in
which business is ordinarily conducted. . . .On the other hand, it would seem
that in general, the cases permitting capital gains treatment reached that
result after a more thorough and complete survey of the entire factual
situation. 229 F.2d 947, 952 (8th Cir. 1956).
46See, e.g., Mathews v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1963); Tidwell v.
Commissioner, 298 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1962); Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130
(6th Cir. 1958); Curtis Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956); Camp v.
Murray, 226 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1955); Chandler v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.
1955); Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield,
218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954); McGah v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1954);
King v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1951); Beck v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d
688 (7th Cir. 1950).
'These factors are sometimes called the "Boomhower tests," because they apparently
were compiled first in Boombower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
The tests as set out in Boomhower were: "continuity of sales or sales related activity over
a period of time; frequency of sales, as opposed to isolated transactions; the activity of the
seller or those acting under his instructions or in his behalf, or the time and labor given
to effect the transactions, such as by improvements or advertisement to attract purchasers;
the extent or substantiality of the transactions; the reasons for, purpose, or nature of the
acquisition of the subject matter." Id. at 1002.
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under one of three categories: (1) those which have a signal effect-
i.e., to bring the transaction to the attention of the Commissioner;
(2) those which relate to the taxpayer's intent with respect to his
sales; and (3) those which look to the "busyness" of the taxpayer
in carrying on his sales.
B. Signal Factors
1. Subdivision The presence of subdivision usually is not considered
a factor in itself. Rather, the act of subdividing rather than selling
in large tracts seems to raise an inference that the taxpayer is a dealer
in real estate. In most cases capital gains treatment is readily available
if the property is sold just as the taxpayer acquired it,"' but the act
of subdivision has a signal effect in bringing the taxpayer's sales
under closer scrutiny by the Commissioner. At times the mere fact
of subdivision has acted almost as a prima facie case in favor of the
Commissioner."' The better approach, however, is to consider this fact
as merely calling for an examination of additional circumstances sur-
rounding the sales."0 If the taxpayer acquires property which is
already subdivided it is possible that he purchases it to sell in the
course of a business.'" Nevertheless, this is not necessarily true, and
again the other factors should be consulted."2
2. Improvements To an extent, the presence of improvements, just
as subdivision, acts as a signal. This factor takes on greater im-
portance, however, if the improvements are substantial.
Improving to an extent greater than is necessary to bring about a
profitable disposition of the lots may imply a business operation. There
is no clear line as to what improvements may cause a loss of investor
status, and of course other factors present have a bearing on what
is allowed. At times, weight is placed on the necessity of the im-
provements made. Thus, levelling land and grading dirt roads have
been held not to defeat capital gains treatment when they were
necessary to make the property accessible to prospective purchasers."
On the other hand, some improvements are almost always considered
to be inconsistent with a contention that the taxpayer is liquidating
a capital asset. For example, the construction for sale of homes on
"Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130, 136 (6th Cir. 1958). But where it appears
that the land is more valuable if left in large tracts, the fact that it is not subdivided
does not necessarily operate in the taxpayer's favor. Pennroad Corp. v. Commissioner, 261
F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1958).
9 See Palos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1952).
50 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
', King v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1951).
"See, e.g., Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1948).
' Gudgel v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1959); Barrios' Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 265 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 19:116
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the lots will nearly always place the taxpayer in the real estate busi-
ness.' Between these two extremes, nothing is certain. Advertising
rental property for sale "as is" has been a factor in obtaining capital
gains treatment." Those courts which allow a close approximation of
normal business methods when the taxpayer is liquidating are more
likely to allow fairly substantial improvements which embellish the
property or make it more saleable"4 than those court which do not.
This result is apparently reached because of the courts' reluctance to
penalize the taxpayer who earnestly intends to liquidate an invest-
ment merely because he chooses means calculated to make the prop-
erty sell faster at a better price.
C. Intent Factors-Purpose For Which Property Is Held
By far the most important factor,' and in turn the most difficult
to ascertain, is the purpose for which the property is held at the time
of sale. Obviously, if the lots are sold, the taxpayer intended to sell
them; but this fact alone will not establish that the taxpayer's pri-
mary purpose at the time of sale was to hold the property for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. Likewise, the fact that
a purchaser often intends, at the time he acquires the property, to
sell it at some indefinite time in the future, should not place it within
the exclusion." To find the purpose for which the property is held,
a number of factors must be considered.
1. Intent to Liquidate It is usually contended by the taxpayer that
he is primarily liquidating a capital asset and only incidentally hold-
ing property for sale. The usual effect of such a finding is to remove
the sales from the held for sale exclusion." Although this is often
the result, the courts have demonstrated clearly that the word "liqui-
dation" will not work as a shibboleth in bringing about capital gains
treatment. Preoccupation with the "busyness" criteria led the courts
in several earlier cases to disregard the fact that the taxpayer was
liquidating, or to hold that the taxpayer was in the business of
" See Kaltreider v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1958), in which the taxpayer
built homes on farmland and reported ordinary income on the sales of the houses while
claiming capital gains on the lots. The court held that the entire gain was ordinary income.
"5Curtis Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956).
"0E.g., Voss v. United States, 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964); Fahs v. Crawford, 161
F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1947).
"7 See, e.g., Bauschard v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir. 1960); Gamble v.
Commissioner, 242 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1957); Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner,
190 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1951).
"sPalos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1952).
"'Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1958); Alabama Mineral Land Co.
v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1957); Curtis Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 167
(3d Cir. 1956); Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); McGah v. Commissioner,
210 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1954). See also Elmer Farley, 7 T.C. 198 (1946).
1965 ]
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liquidating when the objective elements of a business were present."0
In Snell v. Commissioner,"' the taxpayer, who had been in the real
estate business for a number of years, decided to get out of that
business and began selling his property without acquiring more. The
court held that "the fact that he bought no additional lands during
this period does not prevent his activities being a business. He merely
had enough land to do a large business without buying any more.""
Once the court began to look to the taxpayer's intent, however, the
fact of liquidation became more important. In White v. Commis-
sioner," the court upheld a Tax Court finding that the taxpayer who
subdivided and sold property he had acquired through foreclosure of
paving liens was in the business of selling property, repeating that
the mere fact of liquidation does not preclude the existence of a
business. Nevertheless, the court went on to say that liquidation
should not be disregarded completely."4
2. Mode of Acquisition and Use of Property Whenever the court
examines the taxpayer's intent, a good deal of weight is given to a
subsidiary factor, the purpose for which the property was acquired.
For example, in Goldberg v. Commissioner,"5 the taxpayer sold a
number of houses which he had originally built as rental homes. The
court stated that a significant factor was whether he intended to
operate a rental business in the first place. Having found that intent,
the court allowed capital gains treatment and went on to say, "the
original purpose is important, for to counterbalance it there must
be significant objective evidence of a change in that purpose."' " Thus,
the likelihood of having the transaction treated as a liquidation,
thereby receiving capital gains treatment, is greater if the taxpayer
originally acquires the property through inheritance, gift or fore-
closure-i.e., if his role in obtaining the property is passive-or if
the property is purchased to be held in a trade or business. " This was
60 See, e.g., Palos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1952); Brown
v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944); Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607
(9th Cir. 1941); Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938); Richards v. Com-
missioner, 81 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1936).
6197 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938).
62  d. at 893.
03 172 F.2d 629 (sth Cir. 1949).
64Id. at 630.
65223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955).
" Id. at 712. See also Thomas v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 233 (sth Cir. 1958).
"7Starke v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1963) (vacant lots acquired when
bonds which they secured were defaulted); Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th
Cir. 1958) (property acquired through inheritance); Camp v. Murray, 226 F.2d 931 (4th
Cir. 1955) (inherited property); Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 827 (Ct. Cl.
1958) (property acquired through foreclosure).
" Barrios' Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1959); Curtis Co. v. Com-
missioner, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956); McGah v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.
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the result reached, for example, in Smith v. Dunn,9 in which the
property sold was inherited, and in Delsing v. United States," in
which it was used in the trade or business. In these and similar situa-
tions, there can be no inference that the taxpayer set out to acquire
property to sell as there might be if the property were purchased as
an investment. Nevertheless, the same result has been reached in cases
in which the property was acquired merely for investment purposes."
3. Factors Influencing Mode of Sale It frequently happens that there
are external circumstances which persuade or compel the taxpayer to
sell his property. A common victim of such compulsion is a taxpayer
who owns property which has been used in an unprofitable business.
For example, in Barrios' Estate v. Commissioner," the taxpayer sub-
divided and sold land which she had farmed until it became unsuitable
for that purpose. The court afforded capital gains treatment on the
theory that once the taxpayer was compelled to sell, she should be
allowed to adopt the method most likely to bring about the best profit.
Other factors which have been held to be of sufficient persuasive force
are: pressure from the taxpayer's employer to make property available
to other employees during a housing shortage," directions from settlor
to trustee to convert all realty into securities," pressure from bank-
creditor" and need for money."6 As in Barrios' Estate, the courts in
the above situations apparently felt that once the need to sell was
established, the mode adopted was up to the taxpayer. On the other
hand, it has been held that preservation of property values is not a
sufficient motive to justify subdivision of adjacent property into re-
stricted lots."
In addition to forces which induce the taxpayer to decide to sell
the property, there may also be others which influence the mode of
sale which he adopts. At times the taxpayer may find that he is
unable to make a profit upon sale of his land without subdivision and
improvements. In this situation the courts have usually allowed capital
1954); Lobello v. Dunlap, 210 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954); Three States Lumber Co. v.
Commissioner, 158 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1946). But cf. Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527
(9th Cir. 1960); Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952).
69224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955).
70186 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1951).
"See, e.,P., Austin v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1959); Thomas v. Com-
missioner, 254 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958). But see Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122
(5th Cir. 1963).
72265 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1959).
'SCamp v. Murray, 226 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1955).
SChandler v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955).7 5McGah v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1954).
76 Martin Dressen, 17 T.C. 1443 (1952).
"Bauschard v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960).
1965 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
gains treatment."' It would appear, however, that the mere fact that
the taxpayer may expect larger profits by selling subdivided property
than he could by selling large tracts is not in itself a compelling
factor. In almost all cases, in fact, sale by lots is more profitable than
sale of the property intact. This factor, however, coupled with a
compelling reason to sell probably is sufcient to bring about capital
gains treatment."'
An interesting line of cases arose from the sale of rental homes
built during World War II to provide low-cost housing for defense
workers. These homes were built, in most instances, at the behest of
the National Housing Agency and were subject to regulation by that
authority. The regulations limited the amount of rent which could
be charged and forbade sales of the homes except those made pursuant
to purchase options exercisable by the tenant. In many cases the
options were required, in others they were voluntary, but in all cases
no sales were allowed except to the option holders. The rental and
sale of the homes, under the NHA restrictions, was less profitable
than would have been the case on the open market. The courts in
looking to these similar facts reached conflicting results. Several cases
allowed capital gains treatment by emphasizing the coercive nature of
the regulations and apparently concluded that had the taxpayer in-
tended to be in the business of selling homes, he would have chosen
more profitable methods."0 Others looked primarily to the "busyness"
surrounding the sales, ignored the regulations, and found that the
property was held primarily for sale.8" The wartime rental cases are,
of course, unique, and it is unlikely that such circumstances are found
in the present cases. It is significant, however, to note the diversity
that resulted from the courts' consideration of these cases which were
so strikingly similar in their fact situations.
D. Busyness Factors
1. Sales Activity No factor will place the taxpayer within the held
for sale proscription as readily as substantial sales activity. By be-
coming greatly involved, the taxpayer satisfies not only the "busyness"
"'Voss v. United States, 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964); Riedel v. Commissioner, 261
F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1958); Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1958). But
cf. Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960); Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195
F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952).
7 See notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text.
80Dillon v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1954); McGah v. Commissioner,
210 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1954); Victory Housing No. 2, Inc. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d
371 (10th Cir. 1953); Delsing v. United States, 186 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1951).
85Achong v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1957); Galena Oaks Corp. v.
Scofield, 218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954); Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263




element, but he also shows considerable evidence of an intent to sell
property in the course of a business. The degree of activity allowed
before one loses capital gains treatment is, of course, subject to the
other facts present in each case. The taxpayer, however, treads
on dangerous ground if he does much more than merely sit back and
wait for prospective purchasers to come to him." Extensive adver-
tising, listing and solicitation of buyers unfamiliar to the taxpayer
often will result in ordinary income treatment in the event of a sale."3
The placing of for-sale signs on the property may also work the same
result. In fact, the absence of for-sale signs has been held not to
remove the element of sales activity when the taxpayer was selling on
a seller's market and a lack of signs created an appearance of scarcity."
Setting an inflexible price on each lot, rather than negotiating with
the individual buyer, may be considered to be evidence that the prop-
erty is held primarily for sale. '
When the taxpayer sells the lots himself, it is difficult to avoid
adopting methods similar to those used by a dealer in real estate.
Nevertheless, the courts apparently are more willing to overlook sub-
division, improvements and frequency and continuity of sales than
they are sales activity. Several cases which have allowed capital gains
where the number of sales were massive have pointed out that the
taxpayer was not himself carrying on the sales, or if he was, that
his role was passive."
Indirect methods of selling may offer substantial advantages. Hiring
a real estate broker may be one method of avoiding involvement
on the part of the taxpayer, but the courts often apply agency
principles and impute the broker's acts to the taxpayer."' The amount
of supervision and control exercised by the taxpayer over the agent
must be considered. If control is great, the agent's acts probably will
be imputed to the taxpayer. Conversely, if the taxpayer is acquiescent
and does not supervise the agent's activity, the courts may classify
82 See Elmer Farley, 7 T.C. 198 (1946), in which the taxpayer engaged in practically no
sales activities.
83 It is often said that the lack of sales activity-e.g., listing, promoting or advertising
-does not show that the taxpayer did not hold property primarily for sale if, due to
general business conditions, these activities were not necessary. Thompson v. Commissioner,
322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); William H. Miller, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 198 (1962).
84Pacific Homes, Inc. v. United States, 230 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1956).
8'Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963).
88 United States"v. Kalmutz, 309 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1963); Goldberg v. Commissioner,
223 F.2d 709 (sth Cir. 1955); Elmer Farley, 7 T.C. 198 (1946). But cf., Gudgel v.
Commissioner, 273 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1959).
87 Brauschard v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960); Wood v. Commissioner,
276 F.2d 586 (5th Cit. 1960); Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cit. 1947).
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the agent as an independent contractor and refuse to attribute his
acts to the taxpayer. 8
Various business forms have been adopted to bypass the held for
sale exclusion, but it appears that the courts will not allow the form to
obscure the substance of the transaction. In Jacobs v. Commissioner,"'
the taxpayer, a dealer in real estate, attempted to isolate himself from
the sales transactions by forming a corporation. He sold the property
to the corporation in exchange for its stock and later sold the stock
to another party who intended to develop and sell the real estate. The
court found that the property had at all times been held for sale in
the course of his business and taxed him at ordinary rates on the sale
of stock. If the taxpayer has no control over the entity selling the
property for his benefit, he is more likely to receive capital gains
treatment. 0 Thus, in United States v. Rosebrooz," the court refused to
impute the activities of the trustees, real estate dealers, to a taxpayer
who was a partial beneficiary under a trust set up to sell real estate
holdings.
2. Frequency and Continuity of Sales It is difficult to determine
from the cases what is considered frequent and continuous and what
is casual. The sale of twenty-nine lots in three years has been held to
be too many sales to qualify for capital gains treatment," although the
sale of ninety rental houses in one year has not been considered exces-
sive.'" The cases are too numerous, with factual situations too diverse,
for any line to be drawn. Nonetheless, one will more easily appear to
be in the business of selling real estate if he sells many lots over a short
period of time than if he sells only a few in isolated transactions.
Therefore, the "busyness"-intent dichotomy again becomes im-
portant. The Ninth Circuit has refused capital gains in cases in which
frequency and continuity of sales have stood almost alone as evidence
that the taxpayer was holding the property primarily for sale in the
ordinary course of business."' The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand,
has questioned the validity of the frequency and continuity test by
"Boomhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947). Apparently it is
the exercise of control, not the mere right, which is important. Voss v. United States, 329
F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964).
s244 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955).
goIn Ackerman v. United States, 335 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1964), both a trust set up
to hold title to the property to be sold and a corporation which sold the property were dis-
regarded where the taxpayer and his brothers had substantial control over both entities.
9 316 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963).
"2Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960).
', Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955).
"Palos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1952); Rollingwood
Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951). The Tenth Circuit has also stressed
frequency and continuity. See Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952).
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reasoning that if the taxpayer actually intends to liquidate a large
amount of property, it is only reasonable to expect that there will
be a great number of sales over a short period of time." It would
seem that this factor should be ignored only if there is not sufficient
evidence of sales activity and of an intent of the taxpayer to hold the
property primarily for sale."
3. Substantiality of Realty Sales to Principal Business If the income
from realty sales is large in proportion to the taxpayer's normal busi-
ness income, it might be seen as strong evidence that he is engaged in
the real estate business. There is no formula for determining at just
what point sales income becomes too substantial for capital gains
treatment. Once again, a court that rejects liquidation intent empha-
sizes substantiality, usually in conjunction with frequency and con-
tinuity."
The factor of substantiality is actually based on two relationships,
viz., the time spent in selling realty compared to the time spent in
taxpayer's primary business, and the proportion of sales income re-
sulting from realty sales to that from his principal source. The former
presents few problems. It is clear that a taxpayer may be in more than
one business at a time," and if he spends a large portion of his time
dealing in real estate he may expect to be classified as a dealer. It is
the second factor which may create hardship. When liquidation of
a large capital asset is intended, just as it is natural to expect fre-
quency and continuity, it is almost inevitable that the income from
that liquidation will be lumped over a short time and in many cases
will exceed the taxpayer's regular income. When this factor is con-
sidered significant, the very considerations which originally preci-
pitated capital gains relief are the ones which will cause the taxpayer
to lose capital gains treatment.99 In cases in which the taxpayer
"SSmith v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1956); Goldberg v. Commissioner,
223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955). But cf. Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (5th
Cir. 1950), in which the court placed emphasis on the lack of frequency and continuity of
the taxpayer's sales in finding that the property was held primarily for sale, thereby limiting
him to a capital loss deduction.
g The rationale behind discounting the validity of frequency and continuity of sales
is that, if the property is liquidated on a seller's market, the element of substantial sales
may be present without a corresponding excess of sales activity. Goldberg v. Commissioner,
223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955). If this is indeed the reason, then there should be an exami-
nation of whether the sales were frequent only because of the seller's market, or because
of the taxpayer's promotion. If the latter is true, then frequency and continuity would
seem to be further valid evidence of an intent to hold the property primarily for sale in the
course of a business.
"
7Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); Welch v. Solomon, 99
F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1938).
"SMauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952); Fahs v. Crawford, 161
F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1947); Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1938).
9 See notes 2 and 3 su pra, and accompanying text.
196S]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
actually is involved in the business of selling realty this is justifiable.
But the cases in which this factor will create the greatest hardship are
those in which the taxpayer attempts to rid himself of property which
has been held or used in an unprofitable business. In such an instance,
the same element which caused him to liquidate-i.e., insufficient
income from his business-is compared to the income resulting from
the sales. One need not be selling property used in an unprofitable
business to experience the harshness of this paradox. The same result
is reached in all cases in which the taxpayer's activity and purposes
in selling would not be sufficient to classify him as a dealer without
a consideration of the substantiality of his sales.' The example of the
sale of business property demonstrates the error in the substantiality
test if carried to its logical end. If in fact the taxpayer is in the real
estate business, payment of ordinary income rates on lumped income
is a correct result; but the question of substantiality of realty income
to other income should not be raised in the determination of whether
he is in that business. Some cases have recognized that substantiality
of income is important only if it shows that there was also a sub-
stantial amount of time and activity expended by the taxpayer in
making his sales.' This seems to be the more valid approach.
4. Other Dealings in Realty The same factors which are examined
when an investor sells realty are considered when a dealer claims
capital gains on a portion of his transactions, but the degree of diffi-
culty in establishing that the property was not held for sale in the
realtor's business is greater. His burden is increased twofold: first, the
fact that he is a dealer with respect to other property makes it difficult
to segregate any realty to be held as a capital asset; 0 second, the
major portion of his time usually is spent in realty transactions, thus
cloaking his investment activity with the element of "busyness.' ' 3
It has been possible to separate his investment holdings from activities
in his business, but only by keeping accurate records and accounts
which clearly show his intent not to hold the property for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business."4 Capital gains treat-
ment has also been allowed when evidence showed that he was
liquidating his realty business.'
Just as the dealer is placed under a greater burden, the risk of
.. Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952); Greene v. Commissioner,
141 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1944); cert. denied, 323 U.S. 717 (1944) (sale of oil and gas
interests).
1o1 E.g., Austin v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1959).
... Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952).
" Gruver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1944).
'O' Lobello v. Dunlop, 210 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954).




losing capital gains treatment is greater for the investor who has a
history of real estate dealings and who holds other investment prop-
erty at the time the questioned sales were made.' And, like the
dealer, it is possible for him to receive capital gains treatment on
part of his sales while being taxed at ordinary rates on others." ' Some
factors which may work against the taxpayer are evidence of sales
activity with respect to other property,"' continuous purchases and
sales of realty,"' holding a dealer's license,"' maintaining an office
from which to handle realty sales," and declaring himself as a dealer
on his income tax return."' The taxpayer who avoids all unnecessary
indicia common to dealers is more likely to retain his investor status.
E. Summary
Because of the uncertainty in the cases, there is no formula for the
taxpayer to follow to avoid dealer classification while disposing of his
lots. Nevertheless, certain minimum standards may be suggested
which, if practical, the taxpayer would be prudent to observe. It is
difficult for the taxpayer to control the factors which evidence his in-
tent unless he has them in mind prior to his acquisition of the property.
The "busyness" factor, on the other hand, may be controlled if ob-
served immediately before and during the sales. Of course, the easiest
way to escape suddenly finding oneself in the real estate business is
to avoid subdivision and improvement. Difficulties are rarely en-
countered if the taxpayer disposes of his property in the same market
as that in which he acquired it. If reasons compel development of the
property, however, or if the opportunities for profit on subdivided
property substantially exceed those available for the sale of large
tracts, there is still a good chance that the sales will be given capital
gains treatment.
Once the decision to subdivide has been made, the taxpayer must be
careful to avoid the disqualifying tests which the courts will consider.
The most promising way to avoid becoming an unwitting real estate
dealer is to insulate oneself from the entire transaction by contracting
with a real estate agent or broker to develop and sell the property. It
10' Tidwell v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1962).
'"lWood v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1960).
" Tidwell v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1962); Ralph A. Horton, 13
CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 899 (1954).
'"Gruver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1944).
'"Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952). But if a license is required
by law in order to participate in certain transactions, that should not work against the
taxpayer. Carruth v. United States 167 F. Supo. 294 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
".. Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952) (taxpayer apportioned office
expense between law practice and realty sales).
.' Pacific Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1956); Friend v.
Commissioner, supra note 111; Oliver v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1943).
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should be kept in mind, however, that, if too much control and super-
vision is exercised over the agent, there is a good possibility that his ac-
tivities will be imputed to the taxpayer. Another method which may
be helpful is to establish a separate business entity to dispose of the
property, but here again control over that entity may bring about
attribution of that entity's activities to the taxpayer. This form
carries the additional disadvantage of raising the inference that the
taxpayer is using the back door to gain capital gains treatment.
If the transactions are to be carried on solely by the taxpayer, he
should avoid excesses. If at all practical, he should attempt to limit
himself to the following procedures in disposing of his lots. The safest
means of advertising is by word of mouth; if impractical, the adver-
tising employed should be minimal. Any appearance of attempting
to appeal to the public should be avoided. Listing with a broker may
be advisable; but, on the other hand, it might be considered excessive
sales activity. For-sale signs should not be used. Prices should not be
fixed and inflexible, but should be open to negotiation. Using an
office from which to conduct sales may result in a land office business,
but it will probably also result in paying ordinary rates on any
profits. A dealer's or broker's license should not be obtained unless it
is required by law, and one should not list his occupation on his tax
return as a dealer in real estate if in fact he is not. If possible, sales
should be made in large blocks rather than by individual lots, and
the transactions should be spread out over a long period of time. Also,
the taxpayer should avoid reinvesting the proceeds from his sales in
more realty to be developed and sold. In short, all methods character-
istic of those used by real estate dealers should be avoided if possible.
It is possible that the taxpayer could become more than minimally
involved in his sales without losing capital gains treatment. This de-
pends upon the court which hears the case and upon the many other
factors present, e.g., the prior holding of the land and the relation-
ship of realty sales to the normal occupation of the taxpayer. How-
ever, in this chaotic area of tax law one should not hope for the best
unless he has taken maximum precautions against a finding that the
property was held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his business.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts are confronted with countervailing policies each time
a taxpayer claims capital gains treatment for profits received from
the sale of subdivided realty. On the one hand is the desirability of
allowing an investor to liquidate his investment in the manner most
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likely to result in a profitable return. On the other hand is the un-
desirability of giving preferential tax treatment to one who is actually
in the business of selling real estate. The divergent results in the cases
can, for the most part, be explained by the adherence of the different
courts to one or the other of these dichotomous considerations. Many
courts have reasoned that one who is liquidating his realty should be
allowed to employ whatever methods are advantageous in bringing
about the highest possible yield or, in many cases, the only methods
which will insure a profit. As a result, many taxpayers are afforded
capital gains treatment on great portions of their incomes when in
fact their business activities differ little from those of the dealer who
pays taxes at ordinary rates. Apparently, it is precisely this result
which has prompted the courts coming to an opposite conclusion on
similar facts to reject the liquidation argument except in the clearest
situations. Under these circumstances, the taxpayer will receive
capital gains treatment only at the expense of rejecting the business
methods of a dealer which, in most cases, are the most profitable.
Due to this conflict in basic approach to capital gains in this area,
it is unlikely that uniformity ever will be achieved. One cannot say
that either approach is more valid than the other; each has basis both
in the statutes and in the case law. It is only when one approach is
emphasized totally without regard for the other that the basic prin-
ciples of capital gains treatment are frustrated. A court should not
come to a decision without a thorough examination of both the
"busyness" and intent factors present throughout the entire history
of the taxpayer's activities relating to the realty sold. The purpose
for and mode of acquisition of the property should be an important
consideration, as should the use of the property during the time it
was held and the circumstances surrounding the decision to sell. These
factors, if supporting the taxpayer's contention that he merely is
liquidating a capital asset, should be weighed heavily against purely
objective evidence, contemporaneous with his sales, which might
imply the existence of a real estate business. On the other hand,
these subjective factors might often show that the taxpayer is indeed
intending to carry on a real estate business when in fact his sales are
handled carefully so as to avoid dealership classification.
The objective factors should be important insofar as they negative
the taxpayer's contention that he is liquidating a capital asset. Thus,
sales activities, if they involve a great deal of the taxpayer's time and
are employed to an unnecessary extent; frequency and continuity;
and even substantiality of sales income to the rest of the taxpayer's
income should be good evidence of a dealer's status in spite of contra
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subjective evidence. A short holding period before subdivision and
sale may raise a strong inference that sale for profit was intended when
the property originally was acquired; the same is true with evidence
that the taxpayer is reinvesting the sales proceeds in additional realty
in order to carry on a continuing pattern of subdivision and sale. All
of these factors are consonant with the idea that the property is held
primarily for sale, and it should take a great deal of evidence to the
contrary for the taxpayer to overturn a presumption that he is in the
real estate business.
Even if the discord in the basic approaches were resolved, con-
flict in the decisions would persist. The nature of the held for sale
exclusion is such that it may only be determined by an ad hoc ap-
proach to each case. In this situation and in view of the number of
cases which have arisen, it is inevitable that the eleven circuit courts
will disagree extensively. The Supreme Court has not decided a case in
this immediate area, but if it does it will not be able to help a great
deal, as it will be confronted with only one of many possible fact situ-
ations. Perhaps a statement from that Court indicating the factors
upon which the greatest emphasis should be placed in determining
whether property is held for sale would add a certain amount of
clarity, but it is doubtful whether this would be of much help.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that legislation could be drafted which
would alleviate the problem. Section 123713 was enacted to deal
with this specific area, but it has proven to be of little use. The most
obvious shortcomings of section 1237 are its sharply limited applica-
bility and the artificial restrictions and penalties, not found elsewhere
in the law of capital gains, placed on those to whom it does apply.
The taxpayer is probably in a better position in the courts than he
would be under any new, workable legislation. The fault of the case
law which has developed is not so much the direction it has taken as
it is the lack of uniformity and predictability. If the present capital
gains structure and the held for sale exclusion are to be retained, an
1131n 1954 Congress took note of the chaotic situation which existed and described
it as follows: "At present, an individual who subdivides real property held for investment
purpos~s is likely to be held a dealer and subjected to ordinary income tax rates on the entire
long-term gains. However, an individual holding real property for investment may find that
the only way to dispose of it at a reasonable price is to subdivide it into lots." H.R. Rep.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1954). The result was § 1237 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Its primary purpose is to provide a set of criteria more favorable to the taxpayer
in determining whether property is held primarily for sale. Pursuant to this purpose, Con-
gress provided that the acts of subdivision and sales activity by the taxpayer should be
ignored by the Commissioner. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237(a). It appears that the
statute has been unsuccessful in reaching the result intended.
In order to qualify for § 1237 treatment, the taxpayer must have held the land for
a period of five years unless the land was acquired by inheritance, in which case there is
no holding-period requirement. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237(a) (3). In addition, there
must be no substantial improvements by the taxpayer which enhance the value of the
[Vol. 19:116
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ad hoc approach to the sale of realty is a must. It is difficult to con-
ceive of legislation which would bring about uniformity and yet
preserve this approach.
property. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 1237(a)(2). This requirement is twofold. Not only
must the improvements be substantial, but such improvements must also enhance the Iplue
of the property. The value of the property is considered enhanced if the fair market lue
increases by 10% or more. Treas. Reg. S 1.1237-1 (c) (3) (ii) (1957). The taxpayer is
allowed to make necessary improvements, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237(b) (3), but
these may not be used to adjust his basis, nor may they be deducted as an expense. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, 5 1237(b) (3) (C). If improvements are made the taxpayer must hold
the property for an additional five years after the last sale. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
1237(b) (3). If the property has previously been held for sale, or if the taxpayer holds
other property for sale, 5 1237 does not apply. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237(a) (1).
If the qualifications of 5 1237 are met, the first five sales are taxed at capital gains
rates. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237(b) (1). The sixth lot and all lots sold subsequent there-
to are taxed at ordinary rates to the extent of 5%o of the selling price less selling expenses,
with capital gains realized on the balance of the gain. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237(b) (1).
If the sixth lot is sold in the same year as any of the first five, all sales are subject to the
51 rate. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 1237(b) (1). After the tract from which the lots have
been sold is held an additional five years from the last sale, it becomes a new tract for
purposes of § 1237. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237(c). In other words, the qualifying
taxpayer may subdivide, sell five lots, wait five more years from the last sale to sell five
more lots, repeat this process, and never pay more than capital gains rates on his sales. If §
1237 appears to be of limited application, the regulations passed pursuant to it restrict it
even more. It has been said that § 1237 is "noble in purpose, nebulous in language and
practically nullified by regulation." Spandorf & Tonelson, Capital Gains Provision for Real
Estate Investors in Section 1237-More Promise than Fact, 8 J. Taxation 201 (1958). It
serves little purpose to go deeply into the regulations. Nevertheless, one or two of the re-
strictive regulations should be examined, as there might otherwise be some value in § 1237
without them.
Although the statute provides that evidence of sales activity is to be disregarded in
determining whether § 1237 applies, the regulations provide for the examination of other
evidence which will likely have the same effect as an examination of sales activity. In
determining whether the property has been held primarily for sale, evidence of the following
is to be considered: (1) holding a dealer's license, (2) the sale of clearly investment
property, (3) merely holding investment property without engaging in sales activity and
(4) acting as a salesman of property in which the taxpayer has no financial interest. Treas.
Reg. S 1.1237-1 (a) (3) (1957). None of these factors is to have any weight by itself, but
a combination of any two is strong evidence that the property which the taxpayer is
attempting to bring under § 1237 has been held primarily for sale. Treas. Reg. §
1.1237-1(a)(3) (1957). Another restrictive regulation embodies the prior ownership test,
in which the purpose of a prior owner to hold the property primarily for sale in the course
of his business may be imputed to the taxpayer unless the taxpayer shows evidence to the con-
trary. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-I (b) (3) (1957). The effect of these regulations is to further
restrict the application of an already preclusive code section.
Section 1237 does not foreclose seeking capital gains treatment on all of the taxpayer's
sales under § 1221 and 1231. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (4) (1957). Even if the taxpayer
seeks § 1237 treatment, it does not apply if it is found that capital gains would be afforded
under those sections. Treas. Reg. § 1.1237-1 (a) (4) (1957). Because it is not exclusive and
because almost no one can qualify under it, § 1237 has been virtually ignored. It appears
that when it is used it is used only as an alternative. See, for example, Gault v. Com-
missioner, 332 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964), and Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir. 1960).
Section 1237 was intended to alter the importance of subdvision and sales activity by
prohibiting their consideration and to alter the importance of frequency and continuity
of sales through an allowance of a limited number of sales with capital gains consequences.
Under the "common law" of realty sales, these factors are equally as important as before;
and by seeking capital gains treatment under the old statutes, the taxpayer is exposed to
them. Nevertheless, only in rare circumstances, when all of the stifling requirements havo
been met, would it be advisable to attempt S 1237 treatment.
